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Private information retrieval (PIR) is a database query protocol that provides user privacy, in
that the user can learn a particular entry of the database of his interest but his query would be
hidden from the data centre. Symmetric private information retrieval (SPIR) takes PIR further
by additionally offering database privacy, where the user cannot learn any additional entries of the
database. Unconditionally secure SPIR solutions with multiple databases are known classically, but
are unrealistic because they require long shared secret keys between the parties for secure commu-
nication and shared randomness in the protocol. Here, we propose using quantum key distribution
(QKD) instead for a practical implementation, which can realise both the secure communication
and shared randomness requirements. We prove that QKD maintains the security of the SPIR
protocol and that it is also secure against any external eavesdropper. We also show how such a
classical-quantum system could be implemented practically, using the example of a two-database
SPIR protocol with keys generated by measurement device-independent QKD. Through key rate
calculations, we show that such an implementation is feasible at the metropolitan level with current
QKD technology.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rising concern of personal data privacy, users
of digital services may not want their preferences or se-
lections to be revealed to service providers. This can be
achieved with private information retrieval (PIR), where
users can access specific entries of a database held by
the service provider at a data centre without revealing
his or her entry selection [1]. This cryptographic tech-
nique has found application in areas such as anonymous
communication [2] and protecting user location privacy
in location-based services [3].
However, in some occasions, the service provider or
data centre may not want to reveal more information
about the database than what is necessary, i.e., than
what should have been given to the user. Such a setting is
common in pay-per-access platforms such as iTunes and
Google Play, or in more sensitive environments where the
service provider has to secure the information of other
database entries, like in the case for medical records re-
trieval and biometrics authentication [4]. To provide for
this additional security requirement (i.e., database pri-
vacy), one may employ symmetric private information re-
trieval (SPIR), a sort of two-way secure retrieval scheme
first introduced by Gertner et. al. [5].
In the literature, both PIR and SPIR have been exten-
sively studied in the case where the user only communi-
cates with one data centre. Here in the former, uncon-
ditional security (or information-theoretic security) can
only be achieved by communicating the entire database
from the data centre to the user. This implies that
information-theoretic single database SPIR is not achiev-
able [1]. To overcome this impasse, researchers have
looked to weaker security frameworks, for instance, those
based on computational security [6–9].
On the quantum front, there is also a similar conclu-
sion for single database SPIR [10], i.e., it is not possi-
ble to achieve information-theoretic security even in the
quantum setting. In light of these negative results, pro-
tocols for SPIR have largely evolved to cheat-sensitive
protocols, also known as quantum private query [11]. Ex-
amples of these protocols include those based on quan-
tum oblivious key distribution [12, 13], those based on
sending states to a database oracle [14, 15], and those
based on round-robin QKD protocol [16]. In these proto-
cols, the parties are averse to being caught cheating, so
cheat-detection strategies allows one to construct proto-
cols with more relaxed conditions as compared to those
of SPIR [17]. However, parties can stand to gain infor-
mation by cheating in these protocols and thus the proto-
cols would not satisfy the original security requirements
of SPIR proposed by Ref. [5]. Other attempts at avoiding
the no-go results include using special relativity [18, 19].
One way to achieve information-theoretic security for
SPIR is to communicate with multiple data centres, each
of which holds a copy of the database. In fact, in their
seminal work, Gertner et. al. introduced a k-database
classical SPIR protocol that is information-theoretically
secure, with the assumption that the data centres cannot
communicate (during and after the protocol), and how
one can build these from k-database PIR protocols [5]
. Since then, researchers have studied multi-database
SPIR in the context of compromised and byzantine data
centres [20]. With multiple databases, the communica-
tion complexity of PIR and SPIR protocol can also be
reduced to O(n
1
2k−1 ) based on Gertner’s original proto-
col [5], and even further to O(n10
−7
) by Yekhanin [21],
where n is the number of entries in the database. There
have also been several studies on the quantum version of
multi-database SPIR. Kerenidis et. al. focuses on how
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2SPIR can be performed without shared randomness if
the user is honest [22]. Song et. al. proposed a quantum
multi-database SPIR, but requires shared entanglement
between the data centres and assumes secure classical
and quantum channels [23].
The classical multi-database SPIR protocols proposed
require secure channels, which are not achievable with-
out some pre-shared secret keys between the parties in
the protocol. In principle, the secret keys should be as
long as the messages to be exchanged, but this would be
costly and impractical for applications that work with
large databases or require multiple uses of the SPIR pro-
tocol, e.g., medical records query where each doctor has
to query for the files of multiple patients. In practice,
the standard approach is to use public-key cryptography
(e.g., using the Diffie–Hellman key distribution proto-
col [24]) to expand the initial pre-shared secret key to
a longer key. However, taking this approach could be
risky, for it has been demonstrated that most known key
distribution schemes based on public-key cryptography
are insecure against quantum computing based attacks
(an emerging technology). Evidently, this can be a huge
problem for applications which require long-term secu-
rity, like in the case of electronic health records which
typically requires decades of information confidentiality.
Quantum key distribution (QKD), a relatively ma-
ture technology with already multiple companies sell-
ing commercial QKD devices, provides a solid and
promising solution to the above as it provides an
information-theoretic method to expand pre-shared se-
cret keys [25, 26]. As such, the expanded keys can with-
stand the threats of quantum computing based attacks,
and any other yet-to-be-discovered algorithmic advance-
ments. Moreover, the expansion of keys need not be per-
formed in real-time, i.e., expanded keys can be used for
future SPIR runs. It is important to emphasise here that
QKD cannot lead to a perfectly secure channel in prac-
tice, for it involves some statistical and entropy estima-
tion procedures which carry overhead penalties in the
security. Fortunately, these penalties can be made arbi-
trarily small with a proper security analysis, and subse-
quently the resulting secure channel can be made arbi-
trarily close to a perfect one. It is the goal of our work
to incorporate these technical subtleties into the original
security definition of SPIR so that we can add QKD as
a supporting base layer. Here, we see the QKD layer as
one that provides the necessary secret keys and secure
channels (using one-time pad encryption) for SPIR.
A widely studied QKD network configuration is the
star topology, where multiple QKD users are connected
to a (possibly untrusted) central node, and any two users
can achieve secure communication by performing mea-
surement device-independent (MDI) QKD [27–30] via
the measurement device held by the central node. This
choice of QKD network has the additional benefit that
the number of quantum channels scales linearly in the
number of users, which is an important consideration for
practical deployments. To illustrate how SPIR can be
implemented on this network, we turn to the example of
accessing electronic health records on a database [31]. In
this situation, we assume that the data centres (holding
onto the health records) belongs to the health ministry,
the user is a doctor in a government hospital wanting to
query the medical records of a patient, and they are con-
nected via a network service provider. As shown in Fig. 1,
the network service provider holds the central node that
connects to two data centres and the user in a star topol-
ogy with optical fibre connections labelled by solid lines.
Using MDI-QKD, any two parties can establish a secure
QKD link via the central node, and these are labelled by
dotted lines. The keys generated from these QKD links
can then be used to establish secure communication for
the classical SPIR protocol using one-time pad encryp-
tion. The doctors would thus be able to protect their pa-
tients’ privacy when querying, and the health records of
other patients held by the health ministry would remain
private from both the querying doctor and the network
service provider.
FIG. 1. Schematic of a QKD network with star topology,
which can supply QKD keys for the SPIR protocol. The cen-
tral node (hub) connects to the user and two data centres
with optical fibre (solid lines). Using the physical connection,
any two parties in the protocol can establish a secure QKD
link (dotted lines) via the central node.
In this work, we describe how QKD can be used to re-
lax the requirement of perfectly secure channels in classi-
cal multi-database SPIR, and examine the resources re-
quired for such a protocol. In Sec. II, we introduce the
mathematical notations required to describe the proto-
col and security analysis. In Sec. III, we introduce the
basic elements of a generic SPIR protocol and the orig-
inal SPIR security definition. In Sec. IV, we introduce
QKD channels and its security definitions, generalise the
SPIR definition to a quantum one, and show how QKD
can be incorporated into SPIR as the communication
channel. In Sec. V, we prove the security for a multi-
database SPIR protocol with QKD channels based on
the revised SPIR definitions. In Sec. VI, we introduce
MDI-QKD and perform numerical analysis to determine
the resources required for MDI-QKD to obtain the de-
sired SPIR protocol.
3II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Quantum and Classical Systems
The state of a generic quantum system living in Hilbert
space A is represented by a density operator ρA, a pos-
itive semi-definite matrix with trace one. Classical sys-
tems are modelled by quantum systems whose state is
diagonal in a given orthonormal basis. For a random
variable Y that takes on values y ∈ Y with probability
PY (y) = Pr[Y = y], the corresponding state of the clas-
sical random variable is
ρY =
∑
y∈Y
PY (y) |y〉〈y| , (1)
where {|y〉}y∈Y forms an orthonormal basis. To keep
the above notation compact for multiple variables, we
will sometimes use ΠXY Z(xyz) to represent the tensor
product of classical states, i.e., |x〉〈x| ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗ |z〉〈z|.
A bipartite system on Y A is called classical-quantum
if its state admits the form
ρY A =
∑
y∈Y
py |y〉〈y| ⊗ ρyA, (2)
where ρyA is the state of A conditioned on the event Y =
y.
B. Trace distance and distinguishability
To measure the distinguishability of two quantum sys-
tems, we use the trace distance measure, which for any
two states ρ and σ, is defined as
∆(ρ, σ) =
1
2
‖ρ− σ‖1, (3)
where ‖ρ− σ‖1 is the trace norm of ρ−σ. Notice that the
trace distance is bounded between 0 and 1, with identi-
cal states giving 0 and completely orthogonal states giv-
ing 1. With this, two systems are said to be ε-close if
their states, ρ and σ, satisfy ∆(ρ, σ) ≤ . The trace dis-
tance measure admits a few properties: (1) it satisfies
triangle inequality, i.e., for any ρ, σ, and τ , it satisfies
∆(ρ, σ) ≤ ∆(ρ, τ) + ∆(τ, σ), (2) it is jointly convex in its
inputs, i.e., ∆(
∑
i λiρi,
∑
i λiσi) ≤
∑
i λi∆(ρi, σi), where
λi ≥ 0 and
∑
i λi = 1, (3) it is non-increasing under (
completely positive and trace preserving) CPTP maps
E , i.e., ∆(E (ρ),E (σ)) ≤ ∆(ρ, σ). For classical random
variables Y1 and Y2 that takes on values y ∈ Y with
probability distribution PY1 and PY2 , the trace distance
of their probability distributions reduces to the classical
definition,
∆(Y1, Y2) =
1
2
∑
y∈Y
|Pr[Y1 = y]− Pr[Y2 = y]|. (4)
If the random variables Y1 and Y2 correspond to the
measurement outcome when performing a POVM mea-
surement {Γy}y∈Y on states ρ and σ respectively, the
trace distance of the probability distribution of Y1 and
Y2 would be upper bounded by the trace distance of the
original quantum states [32], i.e.
∆(Y1, Y2) ≤ ∆(ρ, σ). (5)
III. SPIR
A. Generic one-round SPIR protocol
In this section, we introduce some additional notations
and the essential elements of a generic SPIR protocol. A
multi-database SPIR protocol has a user U, who interacts
with k ≥ 2 data centres Dj , j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, each having
a copy of the database, represented by W with n entries.
For simplicity, we focus on databases with single bit en-
tries, i.e., W = (w1, w2, . . . , wn) ∈ {0, 1}n; our analysis
can be easily extended to multi-bit entries.
We also assume that all parties are equipped with a
secure random number generator, which they may use
for cryptography purposes. For our analysis, we denote
the user’s local randomness by R.
Here, we focus on one-round SPIR protocols, where
there is only one round of query from the user to the data
centres, and a single round of reply from the data centres
to the user. In the case of multi-round SPIR protocols,
there can be multiple successive rounds of queries and
answers. A one-round SPIR protocol for two data centres
can thus be defined by a pair of query functions, fquery,1
and fquery,2, to generate the user queries for data centre
1 and data centre 2, respectively, answer functions fans,1
and fans,2 for the data centres to generate their responses
to the queries received, and the decoding function fdec
for the user to retrieve the desired database entry, wx.
These are functions of random variables and hence their
outputs are random variables as well.
A generic one-round two-database SPIR protocol typ-
ically performs the following steps (summarised in Ta-
ble I) for a given input X = x and database W = w:
1. Establishing secure channels: Using pre-
established secret keys, perfectly secure channels
are established between the user and data centres
using one-time pad (OTP) encryption. We use
(K1,K2), (K3,K4), (K5,K6) to represent the se-
cret key pair between data centre 1 and user, be-
tween data centre 2 and user, and between the data
centres, respectively. For example, with this ar-
rangement, the user holds K2 and K4 and data
centre 1 holds K1 and K5. Secure channels con-
necting the user and data centres are denoted by
CU1 and CU2, respectively. Note that the data cen-
tres are not allowed to communicate and hence we
do not need to define any channel for them. To al-
low for two-way secure communication with a sin-
4gle secret key, we split K = (Kenc,Kdec) into two
halves, namely Kenc (for encryption) and Kdec (for
decryption).
2. Query: The user generates queries for data cen-
tres 1 and 2, with Q1 = fquery,1(x,R) and Q2 =
fquery,2(x,R), respectively, and sends them to the
data centres using the secure channels CU1 and
CU2.
3. Answer: Upon receiving the query Q˜1 (which
could be different from Q1), D1 (resp. D2) deter-
mines a reply A1 = fans,1(Q˜1, w,K5) (resp. A2 =
fans,2(Q˜2, w,K6) and sends it to the user via the
secure channels.
4. Retrieval: The user retrieves the desired database
entry value using wˆx = fdec(A˜1, A˜2, Q1, Q2, x,R).
SPIR is designed to resolve situations where the user
or data centres deviate from their expected (honest) be-
haviour. For instance, a dishonest user could communi-
cate bad queries in an attempt to learn additional entries
in w, and dishonest data centres could provide replies
other than the expected answer Aj to learn about x.
That is, a dishonest user can replace Qj in step 2 of
the protocol by an adversarial query Q¯j , and dishonest
data centres can provide adversarial answers A¯j in step
3 of the protocol.
Therefore, a secure SPIR protocol has to address both
forms of attacks. At the heart of multi-database SPIR
is the availability of pre-shared secret keys, which are
pre-distributed between the users and the data centres.
With these pairwise secret keys, the user can securely
send his/her queries, Q1 and Q2, to the respective data
centres, such that neither of the data centres can get both
queries at the same time. Then, by also not allowing
the data centres to communicate, one can enforce that
neither of them can guess correctly x. Crucially, the use
of secure channels also guarantees that no eavesdropper
can get both Q1 and Q2 and hence x. These arguments
collectively imply user privacy.
In the answer phase, it is important that the data cen-
tres do not reveal more than what is supposed to be given
to the user. To achieve this, Gertner et. al. [5] introduced
the task of conditional disclosure of secrets (CDS). This
is broadly described by a three-party task, where Alice
and Bob, each with inputs y and z, are supposed to reveal
a common secret s to Charlie, if and only if y and z sat-
isfy a certain public predicate f(y, z). Indeed, using this
task, one could then draw immediate connections and
see that Q1 and Q2 correspond to y and z, respectively,
and the common secret is the desired database entry wx.
Hence, for CDS to work, some private shared randomness
between the data centres is necessary and this is exactly
given by the secret key pair (K5,K6). These arguments
thus imply that the user cannot get the correct secret
if the queries are not the expected ones, which in turn
provides the required database privacy.
B. Original SPIR security definition
At this point, it is useful to recap the original security
definitions introduced by Gertner et. al. [5]. A SPIR
protocol is said to be secure if it satisfies the correctness,
user privacy, and database privacy conditions. Since the
setting here is purely classical, we assume that the output
views are simply represented by random variables. More
concretely, the view of the user is modelled by random
variable V wU , and the view of the data centre j is modelled
by V xDj , for j = 1, 2, where the dependence of VU (resp.
VDj ) on w (resp. x) is explicitly labelled. Evidently, VU
also contains query information, Q1 and Q2, and commu-
nicated answers A˜1 and A˜2, while VDj contains Q˜j and
Aj , for example.
Definition 1.1 (Correctness). When all the parties in
the protocol are honest, then for any database query x
and database w, the protocol outputs wˆx = wx.
Definition 1.2 (User Privacy). When the user is honest,
then for any w, and for all x and x′, each data centre’s
view satisfies ∆(V xDj , V
x′
Dj
) = 0.
Definition 1.3 (Database Privacy). When the data cen-
tres are honest, then for any x, there exist an x′ such that
for all w and w′ with wx′ = w′x′ , the view of the user sat-
isfies ∆(V wU , V
w′
U ) = 0.
The definition of correctness ensures that the proto-
col yields the desired result wx for the user. For user
privacy, the trace distance measure is used as a distance
metric for measuring the distinguishability of the views.
To see this, suppose a hypothetical experiment where
the data centre is randomly given two views, V xDj and
V x
′
Dj
, and has to determine which of the views is given
to him. His maximum probability of guessing correctly
the identity is directly linked to the trace distance, i.e.,
1/2 + ∆(V xDj , V
x′
Dj
)/2. From this expression, it is then
clear that the trace distance quantifies the advantage the
data centre has in distinguishing between V xDj and V
x′
Dj
.
Hence, having zero advantage in distinguishing between
a system with x and one with x′ indicates that the data
centre can gain no information about x. For database
privacy, a dishonest user can input any x, since the ad-
versarial queries Q¯1 and Q¯2 may not depend on this par-
ticular choice of x. The information to which the user
truly intends to learn would then be implicitly carried by
Q¯1 and Q¯2. The existence of an x
′ such that the user can-
not distinguish between w and w′ satisfying wx′ = w′x′
means that the user is unable to obtain any information
beyond a single entry of the database, wx′ .
5One-Round SPIR Protocol
Step D1 U D2
Input: w R, x w
Key pair (D1 ↔ D2): K5 ←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ K6
Key pair (U↔ D1): K1 ←−−−−→ K2
Key pair (U↔ D2): K4 ←−−−−→ K3
Query: Q1 = fquery,1(x,R), Q2 = fquery,2(x,R)
OTP (U→ D1): Q˜1 = CQ1 ⊕Kdec1
CU1←−−−−− CQ1 = Q1 ⊕Kenc2
OTP (U→ D2): CQ2 = Q2 ⊕Kenc4
CU2−−−−−→ Q˜2 = CQ2 ⊕Kdec3
Answer: A1 = fans,1(Q˜1, w,K5) A2 = fans,2(Q˜2, w,K6)
OTP (D1 → U): CA1 = A1 ⊕Kenc1
CU1−−−−−→ A˜1 = CA1 ⊕Kdec2
OTP (D2 → U): A˜2 = CA2 ⊕Kdec4
CU2←−−−−− CA2 = A2 ⊕Kenc3
Decoding: wˆx = fdec(A˜1, A˜2, Q1, Q2, x, R)
TABLE I. Generic one-round two-database SPIR protocol.
IV. SPIR WITH QKD
A. QKD channel
As mentioned above, our goal is to replace the per-
fectly secure communication channels assumed in multi-
database SPIR with QKD channels. Before going into
more details, it is useful to first recap the essential fea-
tures of QKD and its security definitions.
The goal of QKD is to generate a pair of secure keys
which are identical, uniform and secret from any eaves-
dropper. In this setting, we assume that the underlying
QKD devices are honest and they each have a trusted lo-
cal source of randomness. Below, we use random variable
S instead of K to represent QKD keys.
A generic QKD between party A and party B can ei-
ther succeed in producing a pair of keys, SA, SB ∈ S
(with probability 1− p⊥), or abort and output an abort
flag, SA = SB =⊥ (with probability p⊥). The average
output state of a QKD protocol is hence given by
ρrealSASBE = p⊥ΠSASB (⊥⊥)⊗ σ⊥E
+
∑
s,s′∈S
PSASB (s, s
′)ΠSASB (ss
′)⊗ σs,s′E , (6)
where p⊥ = PSASB (⊥,⊥) is the abort probability and
σs,s
′
E is the quantum state conditioned on the outcome
(s, s′) held by an eavesdropper at the end of the proto-
col. In the below, for brevity, we will use ⊥ to label a
normalised state that is conditioned on protocol abort-
ing, and > to label a normalised state that is conditioned
on the protocol not aborting. For instance, in the above
equation, the first term corresponds to ρreal,⊥SASBE/p⊥, and
the second term corresponds to ρreal,>SASBE/(1− p⊥).
B. QKD security definition
Keys generated from QKD may not be perfectly uni-
form and secret from the eavesdropper, but one can en-
sure that the keys are asymptotically close (in trace dis-
tance) to an ideal key by choosing the right security pa-
rameter. This security parameter is defined by the dis-
tinguishability of QKD keys from an ideal key. The ideal
key described here is related, but slightly different from
the secret key utilised for a secure classical channel. Since
QKD channels can abort, the ideal key used for compari-
son has probability p⊥ of returning an abort flag, whereas
the process of sharing secret keys for secure channels are
typically assumed not to fail. This introduces a loss in
the robustness of the channel (i.e. it can sometime fail),
but does not compromise channel security since protocol
aborting does not provide Eve with any information on
the message. The ideal output state of a QKD is given
as
ρidealSABE = p⊥ΠSASB (⊥⊥)⊗ σ⊥E
+
1
|S|
∑
s,s′∈S:s=s′
ΠSASB (ss
′)⊗ σE , (7)
where σE =
∑
s′′,s′′′∈S PSASB (s
′′, s′′′)σs
′′,s′′′
E is the
marginal state of Eve.
Following Ref. [33], a QKD protocol is said to be ε-
secure if the actual QKD and ideal output states satisfy
∆(ρrealSASBE , ρ
ideal
SASBE) ≤ ε. (8)
The security of QKD can, in fact, be seen as the sum
of two security criteria, namely correctness and secrecy.
6More specifically, it can be shown that,
∆(ρrealSASBE , ρ
ideal
SASBE)
≤ Pr[SA 6= SB ] + (1− p⊥)∆(ρrealSAE , ρidealSAE), (9)
where the terms on the R.H.S. are the correctness and
secrecy conditions, respectively, and they satisfy
Pr[SA 6= SB ] ≤ εcor,
(1− p⊥)∆(ρrealSAE , ρidealSAE) ≤ εsec.
These criteria imply that ε = εcor + εsec.
The correctness criterion, in practice, is typically en-
forced by using hashing, which guarantees that the two
keys are identical except with some small error probabil-
ity, εcor/(1 − p⊥). That is, given the protocol does not
abort, the maximum probability that the generated keys
are different is given by (1−p⊥) Pr[SA 6= SB |pass] ≤ εcor.
The secrecy criterion looks at how distinguishable the
output state of either SA or SB is from the ideal out-
put, after passing through the privacy amplification step
using a quantum-proof randomness extractor. For more
details of these criteria, we refer the interested reader
to Ref. [33]. In the following, for simplicity, we assume
that all QKD channels use the same security parame-
ters, i.e., εcor and εsec, for these can be enforced in prac-
tice with the right error verification and privacy ampli-
fication schemes. The robustness probability is however
harder to enforce as it depends on the quantum channel
behaviour which can be different between channels. To
that end, we will write p⊥,U1, p⊥,U2, and p⊥,12 to rep-
resent the abort probabilities for QKD pairings (U,D1),
(U,D2), and (D1,D2), respectively.
C. SPIR with QKD security definition
In order to analyse SPIR protocols that utilise QKD
keys, it is necessary to generalise the original SPIR se-
curity definition. These changes will have to accommo-
date aspects of a QKD channel that are not normally
present in a perfectly secure channel. More specifically,
we need to consider the possibility that the QKD proto-
col can abort, and that it has a non-zero probability of
outputting an imperfect secret key pair.
In the original SPIR setting, a two-party protocol be-
tween the data centres and user is considered. Here, no
external eavesdropper is included, for secure channels are
used and hence no external party can obtain any infor-
mation from the communication. However, in the case of
practical QKD systems, there is a small possibility that
the eavesdropper could learn something about the secret
keys. To allow for such bad events, we look at SPIR as
a three-party protocol with an eavesdropper called Eve,
and introduce a fourth condition which we term as pro-
tocol secrecy. Similar to the other security conditions,
the protocol secrecy condition requires that the view of
any eavesdropper E be independent of both x and w, as-
suming both the user and data centres are honest. In the
following, we first highlight three considerations when ex-
tending the original SPIR security definition to one that
appropriately captures all possible bad events that may
be caused by imperfect QKD keys.
Firstly, in analysing user privacy (resp. database pri-
vacy), the possibility of getting imperfect secret keys pro-
vides a new avenue for data centres (resp. the user) to
gain more information on x (resp. w). For instance, when
the key pair (S3, S4) is insecure, data centre 1 can gain
information on Q2 and A2, which can be utilised to deter-
mine x. To suitably address these threats, we treat such
situations as a collusion between the data centre and Eve
(whose view contains the ciphertext). In other words, in
analysing user privacy (resp. database privacy), we al-
ways assume that the dishonest party is colluding with
the external eavesdropper, Eve.
Secondly, a feature of the current security definition
of QKD is that the security error (the probability that
the generated secret keys are imperfect/insecure) can be
made arbitrarily small in the limit of infinitely long keys.
To allow for this feature as well in the extended setting,
we introduce compatible definitions by adding security
parameters to each of the condition, all of which should
be possible to make asymptotically small. For instance,
the security parameter for correctness, ηcor, would bound
the probability of error in recovering wx, the security pa-
rameters for user privacy, database privacy and protocol
secrecy, ηUP, ηDP and ηPS , would bound the difference
between the two views given in the condition.
Thirdly, unlike secure communication channels, QKD
protocols can fail due to reasons like high channel noise
or failure to have matching hash values in the error ver-
ification step. In fact, even in the classical case, it is not
inconceivable that an external party can perform denial
of service attack on the channel, e.g., by physically cut-
ting the optical channel. In such a situation, wx cannot
be recovered and the correctness condition will not be
met. To accommodate for such bad events, we modify
the definition to condition out failure events (i.e. only
consider ‘pass’ cases), which has probability
pfail = 1− (1− p⊥,U1)(1− p⊥,U2)(1− p⊥,12). (10)
This conditioning can be performed in practice since an
abort flag, ⊥, is sent in the case of protocol failure. This
is different from having an error in the decoded bit wˆx,
which would be undetectable. Typically, once a QKD
protocol aborts, the users will run the protocol again.
However, for simplicity, we do not include this consider-
ation in our analysis. Nevertheless, we remark that one
should make pfail as small as possible in practice.
The extended security definitions are as follow:
Definition 2.1 (ηcor-correctness). Assuming the user
and the data centres are honest, then for any x and w,
the protocol must fulfil (1−pfail) Pr[wˆx 6= wx|pass] ≤ ηcor.
Definition 2.2 (ηUP-user privacy). Assuming the user
is honest, then for any data centre and the eavesdropper
7(Eve), their total view has to fulfil ∆(ρxDjE, ρ
x′
DjE
) ≤ ηUP
for all x and x′.
Definition 2.3 (ηDP-database privacy). Assuming the
data centres are honest, then for any user and the eaves-
dropper (Eve), and for any x, there exist an x′ such that
for all w and w′ with wx′ = w′x′ , their total view has to
fulfil ∆(ρwUE, ρ
w′
UE) ≤ ηDP.
Definition 2.4 (ηPS-protocol secrecy). Assuming the
user and the data centres are honest, then for any eaves-
dropper (Eve), her view has to fulfil ∆(ρx,wE , ρ
x′,w′
E ) ≤ ηPS
for all (x,w) and (x′, w′).
We call any SPIR protocol that satisfies the above
four conditions as (ηcor,ηUP,ηDP,ηPS)-secure. Note that
the original SPIR definition can be recovered by taking
(0,0,0,0)-security and assuming that there is no protocol
failure pfail = 0. More concretely, definition 1.1 is ob-
tained since ηcor = 0 and pfail = 0 implies Pr[wˆx 6= wx] =
0, definitions 1.2 and 1.3 are obtained by noting that the
trace distance measure is contractive under partial trace
operations.
D. Quantum view modelling
In Ref. [5], the authors proved that there exist a family
of (0,0,0,0)-secure SPIR protocols assuming secure classi-
cal channels. However, establishing these secure channels
require that the user and data centres have pre-shared
keys that are at least as long as the messages to be sent.
Pre-shared keys between the data centres are also re-
quired to perform CDS. This would be impractical for
large databases or situations that require multiple uses
of the SPIR protocol. Therefore, we can capitalise on
QKD, which is a key expansion protocol. Starting with
a small shared key between two parties, QKD can gener-
ate a much longer secret key for use. Hence, we establish
QKD links between the parties to generate keys for both
communication (between the user and data centres) and
as shared randomness (between the data centres).
To analyse the security of the SPIR protocol with
QKD, we need to first examine the view of various parties
in the quantum setting. The protocol follows the generic
one-round SPIR protocol described in Sec. III A, except
that the keys used in key pairing steps are given by QKD
keys instead. More specifically, we replace (K1,K2),
(K3,K4), and (K5,K6) by QKD generated keys (S1, S2),
(S3, S4), and (S5, S6), respectively. We also take that
each set of QKD keys shared between two parties is gen-
erated by a single round of QKD. If any of the three
QKD protocols aborts, i.e., if any of (S1, S2), (S3, S4)
or (S5, S6) returns ⊥ after the first step of establishing
secure channels, then the SPIR protocol will abort. For
simplicity, we take that all random variables that are gen-
erated in the latter steps, including queries, answers and
ciphertext, are set to ⊥. The overall protocol is sum-
marised in Table II.
By expressing the inputs as quantum states and steps
in the protocol as maps, we can obtain the final state for
all four parties, and determine each of their view by per-
forming a partial trace. Here, we introduce four relevant
views that are used in the SPIR security definition. The
total view of the user and Eve (used in database privacy)
is
ρwUE = ρ
w
XRQ1Q2A˜1A˜2S2S4CQ1CQ2CA1CA2E
, (11)
the total view of Eve and data centre 1, and that of Eve
and data centre 2 (used in user privacy) are
ρxD1E = ρ
x
WQ˜1A1S1S5CQ1CQ2CA1CA2E
, (12)
ρxD2E = ρ
x
WQ˜2A2S3S6CQ1CQ2CA1CA2E
, (13)
respectively, and the view of Eve (used in protocol se-
crecy) is
ρx,wE = σ
x,w
CQ1CQ2CA1CA2E
. (14)
Here, we note that E is the side-information of Eve gath-
ered up the OTP steps. As such, E contains all of the
quantum information exchanged over the QKD channels
and all of the classical information exchanged due to er-
ror correction, verification, and privacy amplification.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Here, we show that the security parameters of the as-
sociated QKD protocols can be used to bound the gen-
eralised SPIR security parameters defined above.
Theorem 1. A two-database one-round (0, 0, 0, 0)-secure
SPIR protocol that uses ε-secure QKD keys in place of
ideal keys, where ε = εcor + εsec, is (3εcor, 2ε, 2ε, 4ε)-
secure.
Proof sketch.— For the correctness condition, if the
all of the QKD key pairs are correct and conditioned on
not aborting, then the 0-correctness of the SPIR protocol
guarantees that the decoding will be correct. Moreover,
since there may be key pair events other than the correct
ones that can yield wˆx = wx, we have that
Pr[wˆx = wx|pass] ≥
Pr [{S1 = S2} ∩ {S3 = S4} ∩{S5 = S6}|pass] , (15)
where the conditioning is that all of the QKD protocols
do not abort. Then, by using the union bound, it is
straightforward to show that the probability of error is
upper bounded by the sum of the probability of each
QKD key being wrong, and thus
(1− pfail) Pr[wˆx 6= wx|pass] ≤ 3εcor. (16)
For user privacy, we look at the total view of one data
centre (say D1) together with the eavesdropper, E. How-
ever, it is not straightforward to compare the views for
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Step D1 U D2 E
Input: w R, x w
QKD (D1 ↔ D2): S5
ρrealS5S6E←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ S6 σS5S6E
QKD (U↔ D1): S1
ρrealS1S2E←−−−−→ S2 σS1S2E
QKD (U↔ D2): S4
ρrealS3S4←−−−−→ S3 σS3S4E
Query:
Q1 = fquery,1(x,R)
Q2 = fquery,2(x,R)
OTP (U→ D1): Q˜1 = CQ1 ⊕ Sdec1
CU1←−−−−− CQ1 = Q1 ⊕ Senc2 CQ1
OTP (U→ D2): CQ2 = Q2 ⊕ Senc4
CU2−−−−−→ Q˜2 = CQ2 ⊕ Sdec3 CQ2
Answer: A1 = fans,1(Q˜1, w, S5) A2 = fans,2(Q˜2, w, S6)
OTP (D1 → U): CA1 = A1 ⊕ Senc1
CU1−−−−−→ A˜1 = CA1 ⊕ Sdec2 CA1
OTP (D2 → U): A˜2 = CA2 ⊕ Sdec4
CU2←−−−−− CA2 = A2 ⊕ Senc3 CA2
Decoding: wˆx = fdec(A˜1, A˜2, Q1, Q2, x, R)
TABLE II. Generic one-Round two-database SPIR protocol with QKD
different x. Hence, we introduce an hypothetical sce-
nario which uses an ideal QKD protocol instead of a
real QKD protocol to generate keys for OTP encryp-
tion through CU2 as an intermediate step. This state,
ξxD1E = ξ
x
Q˜1A¯1S1S5WCQ1CQ2CA¯1CA¯2E
has the same set of
variables as ρxD1E in Eq. (12), with the only difference be-
ing that QKD keys S3S4 are ideal. With this intermedi-
ate state, we can split the trace distance into three parts
by using triangle inequality, ∆(ρxD1E, ξ
x
D1E
), ∆(ξxD1E, ξ
x′
D1E
),
and ∆(ξx
′
D1E
, ρx
′
D1E
).
We first examine the second part, ∆(ξxD1E, ξ
x′
D1E
). When
the protocol aborts, the two views are clearly identical
(i.e. zero trace distance) since all variables have value
⊥, except the keys S1S5E, which are common for both
states. In fact, for all trace distances we examine in
this sketch proof, the two states in the trace distance
are identical when the protocol aborts, and thus we ig-
nore the protocol abort situation. When the protocol
does not abort, we can simplify by using the fact that
any trace-preserving map cannot increase trace distance,
and noting that there are trace-preserving maps from
Q1S1S2S5W to Q˜1A¯1CQ1CA¯1 . Moreover, since the ci-
phertext CQ2CA¯2 is obtained from encryption using ideal
QKD keys S3S4, they are uniformly distributed over
CQ2CA2 , and thus are independent of x and common to
both states. After simplification, the only remaining vari-
able in the trace distance possibly dependent on x is Q1
(the other remaining variables are S1S2S5WE). How-
ever, by 0-user privacy of the SPIR protocol, Q1 is inde-
pendent of x and thus ∆(ξxD1E, ξ
x′
D1E
) = 0.
The second step is to look at the trace distance
∆(ρxD1E, ξ
x
D1E
). Conditioned on protocol not abort-
ing, we can simplify by noting that there are trace-
preserving maps that can map Q1Q2S1S2S3S4S5S6W
to Q˜1A¯1CQ1CQ2CQ2CA¯2 . Since Q1Q2 are independent
of the QKD keys, and S1S2S5S6 are generated by same
QKD protocol, we are left with the trace distance
∆(ρxD1E, ξ
x′
D1E) ≤ (1− pfail)∆(ρ>S3S4E′ , ξ>S3S4E′). (17)
where > labels the conditioning on the protocol not
aborting. In the R.H.S. of the equation, the first state
(resp. second state) corresponds to real QKD keys
(resp. ideal QKD keys) S3S4 with side information
E′ = S1S2S5S6E conditioned on the protocol not abort-
ing. Therefore, from the security definition, the trace
distance is bounded by εcor + εsec. Combining the above
results, one can show that
∆(ρxD1E, ρ
x′
D1E) ≤ 2(εcor + εsec). (18)
This also holds for the total view of D2E.
For database privacy, we examine the total view of the
user, U, together with the eavesdropper Eve, E. We then
introduce a hypothetical scenario where ideal QKD keys
are used instead of real QKD keys as the shared ran-
dom string between the data centres. The correspond-
ing state, ξwUE = ξ
w
XRQ¯1Q¯2A˜1A˜2S2S4CQ¯1CQ¯2CA1CA2E
, con-
tains the same variables as ρUE in Eq. (11), except that
S5S6 are ideal QKD keys. Therefore, we can use trian-
gle inequality to split the trace distance into three parts,
∆(ρwUE, ξ
w
UE), ∆(ξ
w
UE, ξ
w′
UE), and ∆(ξ
w′
UE, ρ
w′
UE).
We first examine the second part, ∆(ξwUE, ξ
w′
UE) for an
arbitrary x. This can be simplified by noting that there
9is a trace-preserving map from Q¯1Q¯2A1A2S1S2S3S4
to A˜1A˜2CQ¯1CQ¯2CA1CA2 . Furthermore, we note that
XRQ¯1Q¯2S1S2S3S4E are independent of w and thus the
remaining terms are A1 and A2. The probability distri-
bution of A1 and A2 here is the same as a hypothetical
scenario where all QKD keys are ideal, and the user sends
the queries Q¯′1 =
˜¯Q1 and Q¯
′
2 =
˜¯Q2 instead. For this
scenario, we can invoke 0-database privacy, which states
there exists an x′ such that for w and w′ with wx′ = w′x′ ,
A1 and A2 are independent on w (i.e. trace distance is
zero). This is true for any adversarial user queries, and
in particular it is true for queries Q¯′1 and Q¯
′
2.
The next step is to examine the trace distance
∆(ρwUE, ξ
w
UE). We note that there are trace-preserving
maps that can be applied to Q¯1Q¯2S1S2S3S4S5S6W to
obtain A1A2CQ¯1CQ¯2CA1CA2 . This simplification, to-
gether with removal of common terms XRQ¯1Q¯2W , and
noting that S1S2S3S4 is generated by the same QKD
protocol for both terms, we arrive at
∆(ρwUE, ξ
w
UE) ≤ (1− pfail)∆(ρ>S5S6E′ , ξ>S5S6E′), (19)
where the side-information is E′ = S1S2S3S4E. The
terms in the trace distance corresponds to the output
state of a real and ideal QKD protocol respectively con-
ditioned on not aborting. Therefore, from the security
definition, this is bounded by εcor + εsec. Combining the
above results, we conclude that there exist a x′ such that
for wx′ = w
′
x′ ,
∆(ρwUE, ρ
w′
UE) ≤ 2(εcor + εsec). (20)
The final condition of protocol secrecy requires the in-
troduction of the view of the eavesdropper for two dif-
ferent scenarios. ξx,w,1E is Eve’s view in a setup where
S1S2 are ideal QKD keys, and ξ
x,w,2
E is Eve’s view where
S1S2S3S4 are ideal QKD keys. Using similar arguments
from the sketch proof of user privacy, one can show that
each change from ρx,wE → ξx,w,1E → ξx,w,2E incurs an er-
ror of ε, resulting in trace distance ∆(ρx,wE , ξ
x,w,2
E ) ≤
2(εcor + εsec).
The next step is to examine the trace distance
∆(ξx,w,2E , ξ
x,w,2
E ). We note that ξ
x,w,2
E = ξ
x,w,2
CQ1CQ2CA1CA2E
is similar to ρx,wE in Eq. (14), except that S1S2S3S4 are
ideal QKD keys. Since CQ1CQ2CA1CA2 are ciphertext
generated using ideal QKD keys S1S2S3S4, they are dis-
tributed uniformly over CQ1CQ2CA1CA2 . Therefore, they
are not dependent on x or w (neither is E), and the trace
distance is ∆(ξx,w,2E , ξ
x,w,2
E ) = 0. Using triangle inequal-
ity to combine the result, we have
∆(ρx,wE , ρ
x′,w′
E ) ≤ 4(εcor + εsec). (21)
VI. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
A. MDI-QKD
For simulation purposes, we look at MDI-QKD with
decoy states [34] as the protocol of choice to generate
the keys used in SPIR. In MDI-QKD, the security of
the QKD key generated is guaranteed even if the eaves-
dropper is the one performing the measurement and an-
nouncing the result, as shown in Figure 2. Hence, in the
setup depicted in Fig. 1, the central node would hold the
measurement device and the other parties would hold the
QKD source. In this case, the MDI nature of the protocol
ensures that the central node cannot gain any informa-
tion about the messages communicated between the user
and data centres.
The MDI-QKD protocol we use is detailed in Ref. [34],
and we provide a summary here. We start with the com-
municating parties, Alice and Bob, each choosing a ba-
sis from {X,Z}, an intensity from {as, a1, . . . , an} and
{bs, b1, . . . , bm} respectively, and a random bit {0, 1}.
They then prepare the corresponding quantum state and
send it to the central node. If the central node is hon-
est, it will perform a Bell state measurement and report
the result, t. Alice and Bob can then reveal their basis
and intensity settings and only select rounds where they
use the same basis states. This sifted key can then be
used for parameter estimation, error correction and pri-
vacy amplification. The final key rate obtained is given
by the sum of key rates for different results reported by
the central node, l =
∑
t lt,
lt ≤nt,0 + nt,1[1− h(et,1)]− leakEC,t
− log 8
εcor
− 2 log 2
ε′tεˆt
− 2 log 1
2εt,PA
,
(22)
where h(x) is the binary entropy of x, nt,0 is the num-
ber of events where either party sends zero photons, nt,1
is the number of events where both parties send one
photon each, et,1 is the error rate for these one-photon
events, leakEC,t is the number of leaked bits from error-
correction, and the ε values are various security and pa-
rameter estimation parameters.
B. SPIR Resource
We examine the performance of the SPIR protocol
based on the type of database it can send for a fixed
number of signals sent to establish the QKD key, N , and
for fixed distances, d. A database is characterised by
the number of entry it has, n, and the size of each en-
try, L. We use the two-database SPIR protocol B′′2 [5],
which requires communication of [7L+3 log
(
n1/3
)
+(3+
3L)n1/3] bits between the user and each data centre, and
(9Ln1/3 + 10L) bits of shared key between the data cen-
tres for CDS. In a typical implementation, it is likely
that the two data centres would be close together, thus
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FIG. 2. Setup for implementing MDI-QKD. Alice and Bob
each holds a source and modulators which can be used to
generate quantum states in basis X or Z and for different
intensities. These states are sent to the central node (Charlie)
which performs a measurement and broadcasts the result. An
honest Charlie would performs Bell state measurement.
the limiting factor would be from the user-data centre
communication since the user would tend to be far from
the data centre itself. Hence, we will only focus on the
the key rate from MDI-QKD between the user and data
centres.
In the analysis, we use similar parameters as in
Ref. [34], with a fibre channel loss of 0.2 dB km−1, de-
tection efficiency of 14.5 %, and background count of
6.02× 10−6. We assume that the central node uses the
measurement device shown in Fig. 3, which allows it
to perform Bell state measurements of states |ψ−〉 and
|ψ+〉. The polarisation misalignment error of this setup
is modelled following Ref. [35], by introducing unitary
rotations in the channels connecting Alice and Bob to
the central node, and a unitary rotation in one arm of
the measurement device after the beam splitter. The
value of the total polarisation misalignment error is set
at 1.5 %. For simplicity, the protocol uses only two de-
coy states, with the weaker one having intensity 5× 10−4.
We also assume that the error correction leakage is given
by leakEC,t = 1.16nth(e
asbs
t ), where nk is the number of
bits of the sifted key (runs that both Alice and Bob pre-
pares in the Z-basis and using the signal intensity) that
is not used for error estimation, and easbst is the corre-
sponding error rate of this sifted key.
We fix the QKD security parameters εcorr =10
−15 and
ε =10−10, which makes the SPIR (3× 10−15, 2× 10−10,
2× 10−10, 4× 10−10)-secure. The key rate l/N is opti-
mised for a given number of signals sent in the QKD key
generation, N , over all free parameters. These include
the intensities, probability distributions of intensity and
basis choices, number of bits used for error estimation,
and the security parameters implicit in ε. We plot the
database parameters for a few setups, with the number
of signal sent, N , being 1012, 1013, and 1014, which cor-
responds to 16.7 min, 2.8 h, and 28 h respectively for a
1 GHz signal rate. The distances used are metropoli-
tan, at 5 km (fits Singapore’s downtown core), 10 km (fits
FIG. 3. Schematic of measurement device held by central
node. Signals sent from Alice and Bob would enter the beam
splitter (BS) before being sent to two polarising beam split-
ters (PBS) and triggering the single photon detectors. The
detectors are labelled based on the polarisation of photon and
path they detect. A detection of both Hc and Vd or Hd and
Vc indicates a projection to
∣∣ψ−〉 and a detection of both Hc
and Vc or Hd and Vd indicates a projection to
∣∣ψ+〉.
Geneva, London inner ring road), and 20 km (fits Wash-
ington DC). We also included four scenarios of database
query usage,
• iTunes: A consumer wants to purchase a song from
the iTunes catalogue, which contains 60 million
songs. (Assume each music file is 10MB) [n =
6× 107, L = 8× 107]
• Electronic Health Records (EHR): A doctor in Sin-
gapore wants to retrieve his patient’s medical chart
from the national health records database. (The
average medical chart file size of a healthy patient
is about 5MB [36], and Singapore’s population is
5.7 million [37]) [n = 5.7× 106, L = 4× 107]
• Fingerprint Data: Border control wants to retrieve
the fingerprint data of a visitor to verify his iden-
tity. (Fingerprint minutiae data size is about 500
bytes [38], and the world population is 7.7 bil-
lion [39]) [n = 7.7× 109, L = 4000]
• Genetic Data: A doctor requests for a gene in a
patient’s genome data to analyse disease risk. (Hu-
man genome contains 19116 protein-coding genes,
with the maximum size of a single gene being 2.47
million base pairs [40]. Since humans have two al-
leles for most genes and there are 4 possible bases,
each gene entry can be encoded as 9.88 million
bits). [n = 19 116, L = 9.88× 106]
The results are shown in Fig. 4.
The B′′2 protocol with QKD has a scaling of O(n
1/3L),
which is reflected in the numerical analysis by the signif-
icantly higher number of database entries that one can
perform SPIR for compared to the database entry size,
which scales linearly with N . This means that the B′′2
protocol is especially useful for databases with small file
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sizes and large number of entries, such as querying the
fingerprint of one person from a database containing the
fingerprint of everyone in the world, which takes about
16.7 minutes of key generation for 10 km distances. For
much larger database entries, such as video files, and un-
compressed music files, the use of the B′′2 protocol with
QKD channels does not appear feasible.
VII. DISCUSSION
Having a multi-database SPIR protocol with QKD pro-
vides information theoretic security, but a drawback in
the setup is that the result obtained by the user, wˆx, can-
not be verified. This allows malicious data centres to send
false information to the user simply by changing the an-
swers sent to the user. This, however, does not affect the
validity of the SPIR protocol. At the practical level, this
act could be detectable for certain applications, such as
music streaming, but could remain undetected for other
applications such as medical test reports, where informa-
tion cannot be independently verified by the user. One
could overcome this by providing additional information,
such as a hash of the desired entry, for the user to perform
verification, but this requires a further analysis which is
beyond the scope of the current work.
In place of ideal keys, we have introduced the use of
QKD keys for use in SPIR, but we require a few addition
assumptions on the parties. In particular, we assume that
(1) the data centres do not intentionally leak the QKD
keys to other parties including Eve, (2) that all messages
sent through the channels CUj must be encrypted with
OTP, and that (3) data centres do not have access to the
classical channels used to establish the QKD keys after
the key exchange step. These additional assumptions are
necessary to prevent the misuse of QKD, which assumes
that both communicating parties act honestly. These
assumptions can be enforced in practice via methods like
supervisory programs or a trusted third party authority.
In our numerical analysis, we used the B′′2 protocol,
but there are other SPIR protocol that one could use.
B′′k protocol is a generalisation of the B
′′
2 protocol that
requires k databases instead of a two, with a scaling of
O(n1/(2k−1)L). This means that it outperforms the B′′2
for applications with a large number of database entries,
but the user would have to communicate with more data
centres.
Alternatively, one could relax the SPIR definition to
allow for other protocols to be used. In the current SPIR
definition, the user is not allowed to learn the values of
the XOR of database entries such as wx⊕wx′ . However,
in certain scenarios the data centre might not mind the
user learning such values, as long as the user only gains
one bit of information, e.g., either wx or some
⊕
x wx.
Such a change would require further modification of Def-
inition 2.3, for instance, to one that reads “there exist
an i(n) = (i1, . . . , in) such that for all w and w
′ with⊕
x ixwx =
⊕
x ixw
′
x”, where ix = 1 indicates that the
user includes wx in the XOR the user learns and wx = 0
otherwise.
The relaxation made to the SPIR definition would
allow us to use another protocol used as the founda-
tion for Song et. al.’s quantum SPIR protocol [23]. In
this protocol, we label the user’s desired bit as wi(n) =⊕n
x=1 ixwx. The user then generates a random string
R(n) ∈ {0, 1}n and sends his queries Q(n)1 = R(n), Q(n)2 =
R(n) ⊕ i(n). The data centres then reply with answers
A1 = (
⊕n
x=1Q1,xwx)⊕K and A2 = (
⊕n
x=1Q2,xwx)⊕K,
where K is a shared random bit between the data centres.
The user would then decode by applying A1 ⊕ A2, and
K ensures that the user can only obtain at most a single
bit. In this setup, the number of bits of communication
between the user and data centre is n + L, and the plot
is shown in Fig. 4, for N = 1013 at 10km. This protocol
can be utilised for iTunes and EHR, which is not feasible
for the B′′2 protocol. The protocol can also achieve close
to the communication limit of L = l for small databases.
This limit is that of the secure communication of a sin-
gle string (entry) of length L, which requires one QKD
secure key bit for each bit of the string. However, the
number of entries that the database can have is limited
in this case, and it can no longer be used for the finger-
print database which has 7.7 billion entries. Therefore,
it can be useful to examine other protocols of SPIR or
relaxed versions of SPIR.
Here, we have shown how multi-database SPIR can
work with QKD channels in place of secure channels. An
interesting extension would be to demonstrate it exper-
imentally, which would pave the way for practical im-
plementation of the protocol in the future. For practical
implementation, it is also useful to explore reasonable re-
laxations of the QKD protocol, such as the one described
above, and other SPIR or relaxed SPIR protocols. By op-
timising the protocol choice for different applications of
SPIR based on the number of entries and database entry
size of the database, one could obtain better performance
for the particular application of interest.
Another interesting extension would be to examine the
performance of SPIR in the situation of a byzantine ad-
versary who may corrupt transmission for some of the
communication channels, and the scenario where this ad-
versary can collude with some data centres. This situa-
tion results in communication between the data centres,
which could compromise user privacy, and inaccurate an-
swers being sent to the user due to corrupted transmis-
sion, which could affect the correctness of the protocol.
The classical case was examined by Wang et. al. [20],
where they also looked at the scenario where an eaves-
dropper that can tap into the communication channels,
but this problem has been addressed in this paper with
QKD. It is thus interesting to explore if the quantum na-
ture of the byzantine adversary and the colluding data
centres could have an impact on SPIR implementation
with QKD channels. The SPIR solution to this scenario
would provide additional security for the user.
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FIG. 4. Plot of database parameters, L, the size of each entry of the database, and n, the number of entries in the database
for various number of signals sent, N , (labelled by different line style) and distances, d (labelled by different colours). Four
points are included that represents the database parameters of the usage scenarios described in the main text. The diagram
also includes a plot for an alternative protocol that requires a more relaxed SPIR definition discussed in Sec. VII.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have introduced the use of QKD in place of se-
cure channels in SPIR, since classical secure channels are
difficult to achieve in practice. To show that replacing
the classical secure channel with QKD channels does not
compromise security, we extended the original SPIR def-
inition to include aspects of QKD that are not normally
present in a secure channel. These include the presence
of an external eavesdropper who may tap into classical
communication and eavesdrop on the quantum channel,
having security parameters due to the possibility of hav-
ing an imperfect secret key and considering that the QKD
protocol may abort. Using the extended SPIR defini-
tion, we then show that the SPIR security parameters
are related to the QKD security parameters, εsec and εcor,
which can be set arbitrarily close to zero. This implies
that one could have a SPIR protocol using QKD keys
with arbitrarily good security. Using MDI-QKD and B′′2
protocol as an example, we also show how such a SPIR
protocol, specifically B′′2 , can be feasible by numerically
simulating the QKD key rates.
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Appendix A: Detailed Security Proof
Theorem 1.1. A two-database one-round (0,0,0,0)-secure SPIR protocol that uses ε-secure QKD keys in place of
ideal keys, where ε = εcor + εsec, is 3εcor-correct.
Proof. We start by noting that when all the QKD keys are correct, S1 = S2, S3 = S4, and S5 = S6, answers generated
by the data centres and messages sent through the channels would be correct. From the 0-correctness of the classical
SPIR protocol, this means that the user would be able to decode correctly, wˆx = wx. Therefore, we have the result
in Eq. (15). Taking the complement of Eq. (15) gives
Pr[wˆx 6= wx|pass] ≤ Pr [{S1 6= S2} ∪ {S3 6= S4} ∪ {S5 6= S6}|pass]
≤ Pr [S1 6= S2|pass] + Pr [S3 6= S4|pass] + Pr [S5 6= S6|pass] ,
where the second inequality is an application of the union bound. This can be directly related to εcor of each channel
to give the correctness condition,
(1− pfail) Pr[wˆx 6= wx|pass] ≤ (1− pfail)
(
εU1cor
1− p⊥,U1 +
εU2cor
1− p⊥,U2 +
ε12cor
1− p⊥,12
)
≤ εU1cor + εU2cor + ε12cor = 3εcor,
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where the second inequality is obtained noting that the probability that the SPIR protocol would abort, pfail, is larger
than the probability that any one QKD protocol aborts, p⊥.
Theorem 1.2. A two-database one-round (0,0,0,0)-secure SPIR protocol that uses ε-secure QKD keys in place of
ideal keys, where ε = εcor + εsec, is 2ε-user private.
Proof. Here, we only provide the security analysis with respect to data centre 1, which can act dishonestly; the same
procedure holds for data centre 2. To compare the total view of D1 and E for different user desired index x, ρ
x
D1E
and ρx
′
D1E
, we first have to introduce an intermediate state, ξxD1E. This state corresponds to a setup in which an ideal
QKD key is generated from the QKD protocol for communication between D2 and U. Using the triangle inequality
property of the trace distance measure, we split the user privacy condition into three parts,
∆(ρxD1E, ρ
x′
D1E) ≤ ∆(ρxD1E, ξxD1E) + ∆(ξxD1E, ξx
′
D1E) + ∆(ξ
x′
D1E, ρ
x′
D1E). (A1)
We start by examining the second term on the R.H.S., which is the trace distance between two views where the
secret key pairs used are (S1, S2) and (S5, S6) from the actual QKD protocols, and (S3, S4) from an ideal QKD
protocol, but with differing user index choices x and x′. Following Eq. (12), we have that
ξxD1E = ξ
x
Q˜1A¯1S1S5WCQ1CQ2CA¯1CA¯2E
= (1− pfail)ξx,>Q˜1A¯1S1S5WCQ1CQ2CA¯1CA¯2E + pfailξ
x,⊥
Q˜1A¯1S1S5WCQ1CQ2CA¯1CA¯2E
where the label > indicates that the state is conditioned on the QKD not aborting (i.e. All QKD keys are not ⊥) and
⊥ indicates that the state is conditioned on QKD aborting. We note that the state conditioned on aborting would
have all terms being ⊥ except possibly the QKD keys and W . Therefore, it is clear that this is independent of x,
∆
(
ξx,⊥
Q˜1A¯1S1S5WCQ1CQ2CA¯1CA¯2E
, ξx
′,⊥
Q˜1A¯1S1S5WCQ1CQ2CA¯1CA¯2E
)
= ∆
(
ξx,⊥S1S5WE , ξ
x′,⊥
S1S5WE
)
= 0
Then, by noting the following trace-preserving mappings
Q1S2
partial trace7→ Q1Senc2 OTP7→ CQ1 , CQ1S1 partial trace7→ Sdec1 CQ1 OTP7→ Q˜1,
Q˜1WS5
f¯ans,17→ A¯1, and A¯1S1 partial trace7→ A¯1Senc1 OTP7→ CA¯1 ,
and using the jointly convex property of trace distance, we further get
∆(ξxD1E, ξ
x′
D1E) ≤ (1− pfail)∆
(
ξx,>Q1S1S2S5WCQ2CA¯2E
, ξx
′,>
Q1S1S2S5WCQ2CA¯2E
)
.
At this point, we note that CQ2 and CA2 are encrypted with an ideal secret key and hence is uniformly distributed
whenever the protocol does not abort. More specifically, CQ2 (resp. CA¯2) is uniformly distributed over CQ2 (resp.CA¯2) with probability 1− pfail. With this, we can expand the trace distance to get
∆(ξxD1E, ξ
x′
D1E)
≤ (1− pfail)∆
ξx,>Q1S1S2S5W ⊗∑
cq2 ,ca2
ΠCQ2CA¯2 (cq2ca2)
|CQ2 ||CA2 |
⊗ σs1,s2,s5E , ξx
′,>
Q1S1S2S5W
⊗
∑
cq2 ,ca2
ΠCQ2CA¯2 (cq2ca2)
|CQ2 ||CA2 |
⊗ σs1,s2,s5E
 .
Note that Q1 and S1S2S5WCQ2CA¯2E are independent of each other, and that S1S2S5WCQ2CA¯2E is independent of
x. In fact, CQ2 and CA¯2 contains no information about Q2 and A¯2 and thus none of x as well. Thus, this gives us
∆(ξxD1E, ξ
x′
D1E) ≤ (1− pfail)∆(ξx,>Q1 , ξ
x′,>
Q1
) ≤ (1− pfail)∆(V xD1 , V x
′
D1 ) = 0.
The second inequality is due to the fact that Q1 is diagonal, which means that the trace distance between probability
distribution of Q1 coincides with the quantum state, and that Q1 is part of the view V
x
D1
. Since Q1 is generated by
a honest user and thus independent on the type of channel used in the protocol, the last equality holds due to 0-user
privacy of the classical protocol.
Let us now examine the first term on the R.H.S. of Eq. (A1), ∆(ρxD1E, ξ
x
D1E
). Likewise, we have that
∆(ρxD1E, ξ
x
D1E) ≤ (1− pfail)∆
(
ρx,>Q1S1S2S5WCQ2CA¯2E
, ξx,>Q1S1S2S5WCQ2CA¯2E
)
.
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Here, we note that the following trace-preserving mappings are applied to Q2S3S4S6W to get CQ2CA¯2 ,
Q2S3S4
partial trace7→ Q2Sdec3 Senc4 OTP7→ CQ2Sdec3 OTP7→ Q˜2, S6WQ˜2
f¯ans,27→ A¯2, A¯2S3 partial trace7→ A¯2Senc3 OTP7→ CA¯2 .
Therefore, we get
∆
(
ρx,>Q1S1S2S5WCQ2CA¯2E
, ξx,>Q1S1S2S5WCQ2CA¯2E
)
≤ ∆
(
ρx,>
Q1Q2A¯2S1S2S3S4S5S6WE
, ξx,>Q1Q2S1S2S3S4S5S6WE
)
.
We note that Q1Q2 are the only systems that depend on x and that they are independent of S1S2S3S4S5S6E; recall
that Q1Q2 are created independently after the QKD steps. Moreover, W = w is fixed and is common to both states.
These arguments thus gives us
∆
(
ρx,>Q1Q2S1S2S3S4S5S6WE , ξ
x,>
Q1Q2S1S2S3S4S5S6WE
)
≤ ∆ (ρ>S1S2S3S4S5S6E , ξ>S1S2S3S4S5S6E) .
Here, we can further partition S1S2S3S4S5S6E into two parts, S3S4 and S1S2S5S6E, and note that S1S2S5S6 is
common to both setups (generated using real QKD protocol). With this, we may view the latter as some extended
side-information E′ = S1S2S5S6E. Then, using the security definition of QKD (by replacing E by E′), we get that
∆(ρxD1E, ξ
x
D1E) ≤ (1− pfail)∆
(
ρ>S1S2S3S4S5S6E , ξ
>
S1S2S3S4S5S6E
)
= (1− pfail)∆
(
ρ>S3S4E′ , ξ
>
S3S4E′
)
=
1− pfail
1− p⊥,U2 ∆
(
ρrealS3S4E′ , ρ
ideal
S3S4E′
) ≤ εcor + εsec,
since ξ>S3S4E′ is an ideal QKD output state conditioned on not aborting. Combining the results, we obtain
∆(ρxD1E, ρ
x′
D1E) ≤ 2(εcor + εsec).
Theorem 1.3. A two-database one-round (0,0,0,0)-secure SPIR protocol that uses ε-secure QKD keys in place of
ideal keys, where ε = εcor + εsec, is 2ε-database private.
Proof. We start the proof by fixing an arbitrary x since the adversarial queries Q¯1 and Q¯2 sent by the user need not
depend on x in general. Similar to the analysis of user-privacy, we first introduce an intermediate view, ξwUE, that
corresponds to a setup in which the QKD channel between the data centres generates an ideal output state. Using
this state, we can then expand the trace distance in the database privacy condition using the triangle inequality,
∆(ρwUE, ρ
w′
UE) ≤ ∆(ρwUE, ξwUE) + ∆(ξwUE, ξw
′
UE) + ∆(ξ
w′
UE, ρ
w′
UE), (A2)
where for some x′ we have that w 6= w′ but with wx′ = w′x′ . To start with, we examine the second term on the R.H.S.
From Eq. (11), we have
∆(ξwUE, ξ
w′
UE) = ∆
(
ξw
XRQ¯1Q¯2A˜1A˜2S2S4CQ¯1CQ¯2CA1CA2E
, ξw
′
XRQ¯1Q¯2A˜1A˜2S2S4CQ¯1CQ¯2CA1CA2E
)
,
Then, given the following trace-preserving classical mappings,
A1S1S2
partial trace7→ A1Senc1 Sdec2 OTP7→ CA1Sdec2 OTP7→ A˜1, A2S3S4 partial trace7→ A2Senc3 Sdec4 OTP7→ CA2Sdec4 OTP7→ A˜2,
Q¯1S2
partial trace7→ Q¯1Senc2 OTP7→ CQ¯1 , Q¯2S4
partial trace7→ Q¯2Senc4 OTP7→ CQ¯2 ,
and using the jointly convex property of trace distance, we get
∆(ξwUE, ξ
w′
UE) ≤ (1− pfail)∆
(
ξw,>
XRQ¯1Q¯2A1A2S1S2S3S4E
, ξw
′,>
XRQ¯1Q¯2A1A2S1S2S3S4E
)
,
Since XRQ¯1Q¯2S1S2S3S4E are independent on w and is thus common to both terms of the trace distance, we obtain
∆
(
ξw,>
XRQ¯1Q¯2A1A2S1S2S3S4E
, ξw
′,>
XRQ¯1Q¯2A1A2S1S2S3S4E
)
≤ ∆
(
ξw,>A1A2 , ξ
w′,>
A1A2
)
,
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and we note that A1A2 is dependent on
˜¯Q1
˜¯Q2. Since A1A2 here does not depend on the type of channel (ideal or
real QKD), we can equivalently view the system as one where the user sends query Q¯′1 =
˜¯Q1 and Q¯
′
2 =
˜¯Q2, with ideal
QKD keys. Therefore, there exist a x′ such that
∆(ξwUE, ξ
w′
UE) ≤ (1− pfail)∆
(
ξw,>A1A2 , ξ
w′,>
A1A2
)
≤ (1− pfail)∆(V wU , V w
′
U ) = 0,
where the second inequality is due to the fact the state is diagonal in A1A2, and that A1A2 is part of the user’s view
for a setup with user query Q¯′1Q¯
′
2 and secure channels. By invoking the 0-database privacy of such a setup, there
exist a x′ where the equality holds.
Let us now examine the first term on the R.H.S. of Eq. (A2). Likewise, we have that
∆(ρwUE, ξ
w
UE) ≤ (1− pfail)∆
(
ρw,>
XRQ¯1Q¯2A1A2S1S2S3S4E
, ξw,>
XRQ¯1Q¯2A1A2S1S2S3S4E
)
.
We note that the following trace-preserving mappings are applied to Q¯1Q¯2S1S2S3S4S5S6W to get A1A2,
Q¯1S1S2
partial trace7→ Q¯1Sdec1 Senc2 OTP7→ CQ¯1Sdec1
OTP7→ ˜¯Q1, ˜¯Q1WS5 f¯ans,17→ A1,
Q¯2S3S4
partial trace7→ Q¯2Sdec3 Senc4 OTP7→ CQ¯2Sdec3
OTP7→ ˜¯Q2, ˜¯Q2WS6 f¯ans,27→ A2,
Therefore, we obtain
∆
(
ρw,>
XRQ¯1Q¯2A1A2S1S2S3S4E
, ξw,>
XRQ¯1Q¯2A1A2S1S2S3S4E
)
≤ ∆
(
ρw,>
XRQ¯1Q¯2S1S2S3S4S5S6WE
, ξw,>
XRQ¯1Q¯2S1S2S3S4S5S6WE
)
We note that XRQ¯1Q¯2W is independent of S1S2S3S4S5S6E, and are common to both states. This thus gives us
∆
(
ρw,>
XRQ¯1Q¯2A1A2S1S2S3S4E
, ξw,>
XRQ¯1Q¯2A1A2S1S2S3S4E
)
≤ ∆ (ρ>S1S2S3S4S5S6E , ξ>S1S2S3S4S5S6E) .
We can further partition S1S2S3S4S5S6E into two parts, S5S6 and S1S2S3S4E, and note that S1S2S3S4 for both
states are generated using real QKD protocol. With this, we may view the latter as some extended side-information
E′ = S1S2S3S4E. Then, using the security definition of QKD, we get that
∆(ρwUE, ξ
w
UE) ≤ (1− pfail)∆
(
ρ>S1S2S3S4S5S6E , ξ
>
S1S2S3S4S5S6E
)
= (1− pfail)∆(ρ>S5S6E′ , ξ>S5S6E′) =
1− pfail
1− p⊥,12 ∆(ρ
real
S5S6E′ , ρ
ideal
S5S6E′) ≤ εcor + εsec,
since ξ>S3S4E′ is an ideal QKD output state conditioned on not aborting. Note that this is true for any x
′. Combining
the results, we conclude that there exist an x′ such that
∆(ρwUE, ρ
w′
UE) ≤ 2(εcor + εsec).
Theorem 1.4. A two-database one-round (0,0,0,0)-secure classical SPIR protocol that uses ε-secure QKD keys in
place of ideal keys, where ε = εcor + εsec, is 4ε-protocol secret.
Proof. We can define two intermediate states of E, each corresponding to a successive replacement of using real QKD
keys with using an ideal QKD key. More specifically, ξx,w,1E is a setup replacing (S1, S2) with ideal QKD keys, and
ξx,w,2E corresponds to further replacing (S3, S4) with ideal QKD keys. With these definitions, we can expand the trace
distance in the protocol secrecy condition using the triangle inequality,
∆(ρx,wE , ρ
x′,w′
E ) ≤ ∆(ρx,wE , ξx,w,1E )+∆(ξx,w,1E , ξx,w,2E )+∆(ξx,w,2E , ξx
′,w′,2
E )+∆(ξ
x′,w′,2
E , ξ
x′,w′,1
E )+∆(ξ
x′,w′,1
E , ρ
x′,w′
E ). (A3)
We begin with examining the third term on the R.H.S. From Eq. (14), we get
∆(ξx,w,2E , ξ
x′,w′,2
E ) = ∆(ξ
x,w,2
CQ1CQ2CA1CA2E
, ξx
′,w′,2
CQ1CQ2CA1CA2E
).
Using the jointly convex property of trace distance, we obtain
∆(ξx,w,2E , ξ
x′,w′,2
E ) ≤ (1− pfail)∆(ξx,w,2,>CQ1CQ2CA1CA2E , ξ
x′,w′,2,>
CQ1CQ2CA1CA2E
).
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Since ideal QKD keys are used between all parties, CQ1 , CQ2 , CA1 , and CA2 are uniformly distributed over CQ1 , CQ2 ,
CA1 , and CA2 respectively conditioned on protocol not failing. With this, we can expand the trace distance to get
∆(ξx,w,2E , ξ
x′,w′,2
E ) ≤ (1− pfail)
∆
 ∑
cq1cq2ca1ca2
ΠCQ1CQ2CA1CA2 (cq1cq2ca1ca2)
|CQ1 ||CQ2 ||CA1 ||CA2 |
⊗ σE ,
∑
cq1cq2ca1ca2
ΠCQ1CQ2CA1CA2 (cq1cq2ca1ca2)
|CQ1 ||CQ2 ||CA1 ||CA2 |
⊗ σE
 = 0.
Let us now examine the second term on the R.H.S. of Eq. (A3). We first obtain
∆(ξx,w,1E , ξ
x,w,2
E ) ≤ (1− pfail)∆(ξx,w,1,>CQ1CQ2CA1CA2E , ξ
x,w,2,>
CQ1CQ2CA1CA2E
)
Since ideal QKD keys (S1, S2) are used, CQ1 and CA1 are uniformly distributed over CQ1 and CA1 respectively,
conditioned on the protocol not failing. With this, we can expand the trace distance to get
∆(ξx,w,1,>E , ξ
x,w,2,>
E ) ≤ (1− pfail)∆
ξx,w,1,>CQ2CA2E ⊗ ∑
cq1ca1
ΠCQ1CA1 (cq1ca1)
|CQ1 ||CA1 |
, ξx,w,2,>CQ2CA2E ⊗
∑
cq1ca1
ΠCQ1CA1 (cq1ca1)
|CQ1 ||CA1 |
 .
We note that the following trace preserving map can be applied to Q2WS3S4S6 to obtain CQ2CA2 ,
Q2S3S4
partial trace7→ Q2Sdec3 Senc4 OTP7→ CQ2Sdec3 OTP7→ Q˜2, Q˜2WS6
f¯ans,27→ A2, A2S3 partial trace7→ A2Senc3 OTP7→ CA2 .
Therefore, we get
∆(ξx,w,1,>E , ξ
x,w,2,>
E ) ≤ (1− pfail)∆(ξx,w,1,>Q2WS3S4S6E , ξ
x,w,2,>
Q2WS3S4S6E
).
We first note that Q2W is independent of S3S4S6E, and is common to both terms, thus resulting in
∆(ξx,w,1,>Q2WS3S4S6E , ξ
x,w,2,>
Q2WS3S4S6E
) ≤ ∆(ξ1,>S3S4S6E , ξ
2,>
S3S4S6E
).
We can further partition S3S4S6E into two parts, S3S4 and S6E, and note that S6 for both states are generated using
real QKD protocol. With this, we may view the latter as some extended side-information E′ = S6E. Then, using the
security definition of QKD, we get that
∆(ξx,w,1,>E , ξ
x,w,2,>
E ) ≤ (1− pfail)∆(ξ1,>S3S4S6E , ξ
2,>
S3S4S6E
) ≤ 1− pfail
1− p⊥,U2 ∆(ρ
real
S3S4E′ , ρ
ideal
S3S4E′) ≤ εcor + εsec.
We next examine the first term on the R.H.S. of Eq. (A3). We first obtain
∆(ρx,wE , ξ
x,w,1
E ) ≤ (1− pfail)∆(σx,w,>CQ1CQ2CA1CA2E , ξ
x,w,1,>
CQ1CQ2CA1CA2E
)
We note that the following map can be applied on Q1Q2WS1S2S3S4S5S6 to obtain CQ1CQ2CA1CA2 ,
Q1S1S2
partial trace7→ Q1Sdec1 Senc2 OTP7→ CQ1Sdec1 OTP7→ Q˜1, Q˜1WS5
f¯ans,17→ A1, A1S1 partial trace7→ A1Senc1 OTP7→ CA1 ,
Q2S3S4
partial trace7→ Q2Sdec3 Senc4 OTP7→ CQ2Sdec3 OTP7→ Q˜2, Q˜2WS6
f¯ans,27→ A2, A2S3 partial trace7→ A2Senc3 OTP7→ CA2 .
Therefore, we get
∆(σx,w,>CQ1CQ2CA1CA2E , ξ
x,w,1,>
CQ1CQ2CA1CA2E
) ≤ ∆(σx,w,>Q1Q2WS1S2S3S4S5S6E , ξ
x,w,1,>
Q1Q2WS1S2S3S4S5S6E
).
Since Q1Q2W is independent on S1S2S3S4S5S6E, and is common to both terms (with same x and w), we obtain
∆(σx,w,>Q1Q2WS1S2S3S4S5S6E , ξ
x,w,1,>
Q1Q2WS1S2S3S4S5S6E
) ≤ ∆(σ>S1S2S3S4S5S6E , ξ1,>S1S2S3S4S5S6E).
We can further partition S1S2S3S4S5S6E into two parts, S1S2 and S3S4S5S6E, and note that S3S4S5S6 is common
for both states. With this, we may view the latter as some extended side-information E′ = S3S4S5S6E. Then, we
get that
∆(ρx,wE , ξ
x,w,1
E ) ≤ (1− pfail)∆(σ>S1S2E′ , ξ1,>S1S2E′) ≤
1− pfail
1− p⊥,U1 ∆(ρ
real
S1S2E′ , ρ
ideal
S1S2E′) ≤ εcor + εsec.
Combining the results, we obtain
∆(ρx,wE , ρ
x′,w′
E ) ≤ 4ε.
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Appendix B: B′′2 Protocol
For simplicity, we consider a database with size n = m3, with one-bit database entries, W = (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ {0, 1}n.
We label the entries with index X = (X1, X2, X3), where Xi ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, for i = 1, 2, 3. The user has a source
of local randomness labelled by R = (Rs, Rd). Rs consists of three random subsets, R
i
s ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} (which can be
expressed as a random m-bit vector as well), and Rd is a set of three values, R
i
d ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Furthermore, we label
the pre-shared keys, between the two data centres, K3K4, by (U, T, Y, Z), which are used for CDS. We also define the
notation
S4{j} =
{
S \ {j} j ∈ S
S ∪ {j} j /∈ S
for a set S.
We first define the query used in the B′′2 protocol. The user first selects a desired index x = (x
1, x2, x3), and
generates the local random values Rs and Rd. Query to data centre 1 is simply Q1 = (Q1,s, Q1,d), where Q1,s = Rs
and Q1,d = Rd. For the query to data centre 2, the user has to compute Q
i
2,d ≡ xi−Rid(modm), and Q2,s = Ris4{xi}.
The query is thus Q2 = (Q2,s, Q2,d). Essentially, the user encodes his desired index in both the set query as the only
element that is contained exclusively in Q1,s or Q2,s and the index query as the sum of Q1,d and Q2,d modulo m.
The data centre answers consist of 8 portions, which are labelled by index σ = {0, 1}3, and one portion responsible
for CDS to ensure that the user provides valid queries. The keys used for masking the responses are U and T . U consists
of 3 random bits, U i, T consists of 8 bits, Tσ, of which 7 are random, and the final bit is chosen to ensure
⊕
σ T
σ = 0.
Keys that are used for CDS are Y and Z. Y is a set of 6 vectors of length m, Y σ, for σ = {001, 010, 100, 011, 101, 110},
and Z is a set of 3 vectors of length m, Zi. Data centre 1 then computes the answers for j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and i = 1, 2, 3,
A000 =
 ⊕
k∈(Q11,s,Q21,s,Q31,s)
wk
⊕ T 000
A100j =
 ⊕
k∈(Q11,s4{j},Q21,s,Q31,s)
wk
⊕ Y 100j−Q11,d ⊕ T 100
A010j =
 ⊕
k∈(Q11,s,Q21,s4{j},Q31,s)
wk
⊕ Y 010j−Q21,d ⊕ T 010
A001j =
 ⊕
k∈(Q11,s,Q21,s,Q31,s4{j})
wk
⊕ Y 001j−Q31,d ⊕ T 001
ACDSi =
⊕
j
I
Qi1,s
j Z
i
j
⊕ U i,
where IS is the indicator function of set S (i.e. ISj = 1 if j ∈ S and ISj = 0 if j /∈ S). The computed values, together
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with three additional bits Y 011
Q11,d
, Y 101
Q21,d
, and Y 110
Q31,d
, forms the answer A1. Data centre 2 computes the answer
A111 =
 ⊕
k∈(Q12,s,Q22,s,Q32,s)
wk
⊕ T 111
A011j =
 ⊕
k∈(Q12,s4{j},Q22,s,Q32,s)
wk
⊕ Y 011j−Q12,d ⊕ T 011 ⊕ Z1j
A101j =
 ⊕
k∈(Q12,s,Q22,s4{j},Q32,s)
wk
⊕ Y 101j−Q22,d ⊕ T 101 ⊕ Z2j
A110j =
 ⊕
k∈(Q12,s,Q22,s,Q32,s4{j})
wk
⊕ Y 110j−Q32,d ⊕ T 110 ⊕ Z3j
ACDS
′
i =
⊕
j
I
Qi2,s
j Z
i
j
⊕ U i.
The above values, together with three extra bits, Y 100
Q12,d
, Y 010
Q22,d
, and Y 001
Q32,d
, forms the answer A2.
The decoding function is obtained by simply performing an XOR on some of the answer bits received by the user.
If the user is honest, the correct value of wˆx can be obtained from the decoding function. Firstly, by taking the sum
of the CDS answers, we can retrieve the value of Zx using
Zixi = A
CDS
i ⊕ACDS
′
i .
Since Qi1,d +Q
i
2,d ≡ xi(modm), the dependency of Aσ on Y σ can be removed by choosing j = xi for the appropriate
i. The final decoding would thus be
wˆx =
[
(A100x1 ⊕ Y 100Q12,d)⊕ (A
011
x1 ⊕ Y 011Q11,d)⊕ Z
1
x1
]
⊕
[
(A010x2 ⊕ Y 010Q22,d)⊕ (A
101
x2 ⊕ Y 101Q21,d)
]
⊕
[
(A001x3 ⊕ Y 001Q32,d)⊕ (A
110
x3 ⊕ Y 110Q31,d)
]
⊕A111 ⊕A000.
